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ABSTRACT 
Émile Durkheim known among other things for his pioneering sociology of criminal law was also a corporatist theorist 
and can be interpreted as a predecessor for an institutionalist approach that has recently gained popularity in 
comparative criminal justice. Durkheim suggested an inverse relationship between the intensities of “repressive” 
regulation and "restitutive" welfare state regulation. Contemporary institutionalist research has arrived at the same 
conclusion, but the connection between Durkheim’s theory and the empirical observations of modern comparative 
research has gone largely unnoticed in both legal scholarship and sociology. Correcting this omission might prove 
useful for substantive theory: Apart from welfare state strength, neo-institutionalist research has also associated lenient 
criminal law with corporatist political economy and consensus democracy. Durkheim's political sociology proposes an 
answer for the interrelationship between these factors. Durkheim considered social corporatism a democratic institution 
and as such a precondition for a democracy capable of building the collective restitutive regulation that could alleviate 
society's reliance on punitive justice as a basis for social cohesion. 
INTRODUCTION 
Émile Durkheim (1858–1917) pioneered theorizing on criminal justice with an external perspective on its role in 
society. Once considered exhausted (Lukes and Scull 1983), Durkheim’s substantive theory has received some renewed 
interest in sociology of law. For example, Susanne Karstedt (2007) deemed Durkheim’s macro theory a failed one but 
praised the rediscovery of the “cultural Durkheim” while Fergus McNeill and Matt Dawson (2014) analysing probation 
pointed to Durkheim’s political sociology for a fuller appreciation of his contribution. 
My examination concerns criminal justice in the grand scheme of Durkheim’s legal and political theory. Punishment 
has a key place in Durkheim’s general sociology of law. He, first, defined criminal law by the use of a penal sanction 
and, second, contrasted this penal law with modern “restitutive” positive law. According to Durkheim, both types of 
regulation are ways of holding societies together, but the way they build cohesion is fundamentally different. Today an 
increasingly established neo-institutionalist school in comparative criminal justice focuses on punishment and explains 
variation in its intensity through welfare state model, production regime, and political system. 
In sociology of criminal law Durkheim is regularly presented as the initiator of a symbolic line of theorizing that 
emphasizes the cultural meaning of punishment (see esp. Smith 2008), while a neo-Marxist materialist approach was 
begun later by Georg Rusche and Otto Kirchheimer of the critical Frankfurt school. Rusche and Kirchheimer's work 
rose to an exemplary status when a renaissance of sociology of punishment began in the 1970s and inspired Michel 
Foucault among others (Simon 2013). For Foucault prison was a creative instrument in “the political economy of the 
body”. I argue that when the idea of the political economy of punishment (here understood broadly as criminal justice 
manifesting wider regulatory regimes) is taken towards an institutionalist and comparative direction, as has recently 
happened, it is possible to read Durkheim in a way that is not alternative but complimentary to it and has potential to 
improve it. There is a certain legacy of Durkheim that is largely missing from the scholarly literature of punishment and 
society. 
The breadth of this writing is limited to the evaluation and comparison of the basic theses of the new institutionalists 
with Durkheim's. It is meant as a somewhat benign attempt to construct, through interpretation, a substantively useful 
“institutionalist” Durkheim for the framing and analysis of the neo-institutionalist findings. I argue that a useful 
Durkheim can be found in some of the repeating themes of his work. The writing is not, however, a history of ideas, and 
controversies regarding for example the evolution of Durkheim's thought towards his later works are mostly out of its 
scope (for some contemporary readings with significant similarities to mine in wider Durkheim scholarship see Mackert 
2004; Herzog 2018). While Durkheim was more engaged in explaining modernization than differences between types 
of modernity, it is quite possible to adapt insights from the first one for the purposes of the second. Durkheim’s theory 
offers a way to understand the inverse association between punishment and welfare state expenditure. Furthermore, it 
offers a parsimonious causal explanation for the interrelationship of this association with market coordination and 
democracy. The objects of this writing are to present this compatibility between Durkheim’s theory and contemporary 
empirical work and to formulate a Durkheimian causal explanation for the findings of the latter. 
I start by evaluating the neo-institutionalist comparative criminal justice of Michael Cavadino and James Dignan, and 
Nicola Lacey and presenting the central findings of institutionalist comparison more generally (“New Institutionalism in 
Comparative Criminal Justice”). Second, I elucidate the importance of norms and institutions to Durkheim’s sociology 
(“Durkheim the Moralist”). Third, I conclude that the empirical findings of contemporary comparative research are 
compatible with the basic theses of Durkheim’s legal theory (“Durkheim’s Sociology of Law”). In the last section 
before conclusion I propose that Durkheim’s political theory offers a causal explanation for the static empirical 
correlations Durkheim and institutionalist theory agree on (“Political Conditions for Organic Solidarity”). 
NEW INSTITUTIONALISM IN COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
In their classic monograph Rusche and Kirchheimer (1939) concluded that the history of punishment is determined by 
the labour markets: In times of labour shortage forced labour has been utilized to fill the deficit. In times of labour 
surplus penal measures have been used to warehouse or dispose of the excess. The level of harshness in punishment 
always sets itself so that even the poorest remains deterred. Foucault's (1979) later quest was to explain the birth of the 
prison. He attributed it to the demand of the bourgeoisie in industrializing society for a denser and more efficient 
criminal justice that could bring under control the shadow economy of illegalities occurring behind the back of the 
baroque penal policy of the sovereign coinciding with a revolution in the techniques of institutional discipline. The 
result was the individualization of punishment and the growing power of the penal professionals. More recently, one the 
most explicit followers of Rusche and Kirchheimer and Foucault, Alessandro De Giorgi (2006), has analysed the effects 
that change to a post-Fordist production regime has had on punishment and control in the West. Prominent analysts of 
the massive growth of imprisonment in the United States since the 1970s, David Garland (2001) and Loïc Wacquant 
(2009) have also associated the development with changes in the economy and labour markets. Wacquant sees the 
United States as a living experiment in unhinged neoliberalism primed by its exceptional background of anti-
government ideology, federalism, and strong social divisions. The growth of imprisonment was a response to the 
disintegration of its already residual social state and the change of American labour markets from a source of security 
into a source of insecurity and fragmentation. Neoliberalism according to Wacquant is, in fact, strongly interventionist 
towards poverty. Penal policy is coupled with punitive social policy. Both share a common disadvantaged target group 
(which Wacquant demonstrates convincingly), a common behavioural philosophy, and a common goal of creating a 
flexible labour reserve. Wacquant’s analysis of the role of punishment combines materialism with symbolism loosely 
inspired by Durkheim. Prison signals social boundaries and normalizes inequality, redirects insecurities, and reunites 
the deserving sections of people. Wacquant's compelling analysis suffers from a failure to question the behavioural 
effectiveness of prison in regulating the labour reserve which seems contradictory as Wacquant strongly disputes its 
behavioural effectiveness in controlling crime. 
A fact that has been increasingly recognized during the last 20 years or so is that the quality and harshness of criminal 
justice varies considerably between developed economies. A popular way of explaining these comparative differences is 
the concept of (national) cultures (see esp. Whitman 2003; Pratt and Eriksson 2013, cf. culture as meaning or as a 
distinct area of social life). Garland (2006), however, warns that it has the danger of becoming naïve and totalizing—
especially in an era where globalization erodes such differences: 
"Comparative scholarship cannot rely upon totalizing national contrasts as an unproblematic explanatory resource. Nor 
can it be assumed that the specification of a culture’s dominant themes and general figures will unproblematically 
explain specific practices in that society. Thus when Whitman (2003) invokes American culture in contradistinction to 
European culture, pointing to long-standing contrasts in attitudes towards matters of status and individual dignity as an 
explanation for contemporary contrasts in the intensity of punishment, he runs up against the problems of cultural 
pluralism, intracultural contestation and historical change." (Garland 2006, pp. 430–431.) 
Furthermore, while I do not wish to make any sort of ethical condemnation concerning deterministic theories of 
technological materialism or cultural differences, finding aspects of reality that are perhaps more open to choice might 
have practical value. Although Wacquant (2008, pp. 265–270, 277–278) believes the reshaping of the social policy and 
the punitive turn do affect Europe as well, he also believes that the institutions of the welfare state continue to create 
differences between countries in levels and distribution of poverty. Long overshadowed by other approaches, 
institutional theory started to resurge in political studies in the 1980s. Sociological, rational choice, and historical 
frameworks among others have been utilized for institutional analysis. (Lowndes and Roberts 2013.) Institutional theory 
thrives in explaining stability in a presumably contingent world. Institutions set limits to decision making, ration power, 
and shape interests. Institutional reorganizations often caused by external shocks or paradigmatic change have lasting, 
path dependant consequences. A key tool towards explanatory clarity are institutional comparisons. (Hill 2013, pp. 69–
84.)  
Although not without precedent (see e.g. Savelsberg 1994), a ground-breaking contribution towards a neo-
institutionalist comparative criminal justice was made by Cavadino and Dignan. Cavadino and Dignan (2006a) claim 
that institutions explain why penal differences have survived globalization. Somewhat confusingly and even 
contradictorily they call their approach “radical pluralism” instead of institutionalism. Pluralism (following Robert 
Dahl) refers to the belief that policymaking is highly contested horizontally between different interest groups. 
Radicalism (following Marxists) means recognizing the significance of vertical class divisions and inequality. This two-
dimensional fragmentation makes the penal policy process very incoherent. The process is affected by both ideological 
and material factors. (Cavadino and Dignan 2002, pp. 28–31, 76–79, 2006b, pp. 12–14.) It is the comparative effort 
which in the book Penal Systems fortunately leads Cavadino and Dignan to some relatively generalized conclusions. 
Cavadino and Dignan find a straightforward correlation between criminal justice systems and welfare state regime types 
borrowed from Gøsta Esping-Andersen. 
In The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism, Esping-Andersen (1990) argued that developed welfare states cluster 
according to significant qualitative differences. Esping-Andersen classifies welfare states based on their rate of 
decommodification and the system of stratification they impose. Decommodification refers to the extent the welfare 
state makes individual wellbeing independent of the markets. Cavadino and Dignan (2006b) follow Esping-Andersen’s 
classification of welfare state types. Liberal (Anglophone) welfare states are characterized by minimal 
decommodification and inequality, which causes the effective exclusion of the most marginalized members of society 
from social and political participation. Conservative (Continental) welfare states are characterized by a moderate level 
of decommodification, the linking of full social rights with membership in traditional and modern intermediary 
institutions, and family as the basic unit of social policy. Social democratic (Nordic) welfare states are characterized by 
high levels of decommodification, an active state, and strong individual autonomy. Imprisonment rates are highest, 
juvenile justice is harshest, prison privatization has been taken furthest, and the penal crisis is, in general, worst in 
liberal welfare states, followed by conservative welfare states in the middle, and social democratic ones in the lenient 
end. There is an inverse relationship between welfare state strength and the harshness of criminal justice which 
according to Cavadino and Dignan seems to mostly override the criminal justice philosophy of choice and even criminal 
law “in books”. Countries where social and economic policy decommodifies the individual the most form the markets 
have the least punitive penal systems (see also Wacquant 2008, pp. 279). They do not attempt to explain the relationship 
conclusively but merely suggest penal policy reflects the inclusivity or exclusivity of each welfare state culture and the 
attitudes of its elite.  
Cavadino and Dignan were soon followed by Lacey whose work represents perhaps the most rigorous and resolute case 
for institutionalism in comparative criminal justice. In Prisoners’ Dilemma Lacey (2008, pp. 3–61) deplores the 
marginalization of systematic comparisons in sociology of criminal law between theories of cultural singularity on one 
hand and global materialism on the other. Institutions stabilize and filter both cultural and material factors. The 
correlation discovered by Cavadino and Dignan calls for an explanation. This requires a more complete explanatory 
model of institutional interrelationships. How do institutions of the economy, welfare state, and politics produce 
different penal policies in a commonly shared material context? What determines a society’s institutional capability to 
produce inclusive and reintergrative (i.e. normatively democratic) criminal justice? Lacey adopts Peter Hall and David 
Soskice’s dichotomy of varieties of capitalism. The country classification is roughly compatible with that of Esping-
Andersen’s. Hall and Soskice (2001) argue that in (Anglophone) liberal market economies, businesses coordinate their 
network of relations primarily through the institution of markets while in (mostly Continental and Nordic) coordinated 
market economies they rely heavily on other institutions of information exchange, control, and deliberation. Institutional 
frameworks affect the profitability of different economic activities and thus create their own comparative institutional 
advantage meaning that globalization does not lead to economic convergence.  
Lacey proposes that the model of political economy affects state’s incentives to make criminal justice either inclusive or 
exclusive. The strategy of liberal economies to maintain economic competitiveness in globalization has been to increase 
income inequality and cut social spending thus pushing people in to social and, consequently, to penal exclusion. 
Prisons allow for the governing and warehousing of the surplus population. Coordinated economies have taken the route 
of high employment rates and productivity, which has gone hand in hand with the flexibility offered by welfare state 
investment. Inclusive social policy insures specialized know-how. This heavy investment in human capital raises the 
economic cost of penal exclusion. (Lacey 2008, pp. 77–90, 2011, pp. 222–224.) Liberal economies lack the institutional 
tools to regulate the economy and fight inequality in a changing material context which makes resolving the penal crisis 
hard. Scores measuring the level of coordination in the economy have an inverse correlation with imprisonment rates. 
(Lacey 2008, pp. 109–112.)  
Lacey is more ambitious than Cavadino and Dignan in attempting to theorize on the relationship between policy 
regimes and punishment, and Lacey’s model of institutional interrelationships between economic, social, and political 
institutions with each other and with penal policy promises a lot more theoretical clarity than Cavadino and Dignan’s 
radical pluralism. The weakness in Lacey’s attempt is its rational choice economism, and in the end Lacey is not able to 
advance much farther beyond the correlation. Lacey's (2008, p. 58) claim is that "such an economy, which functions in 
terms primarily of long-term relationships and stable structures of investment, not least in education and training 
oriented to company- or sector specific skills, and which incorporates a wide range of social groups and institutions into 
a highly co-ordinated governmental structure, may be more likely, other things being equal, to generate incentives for 
the relevant decision-makers to opt for a relatively inclusionary criminal justice system", but at no point does Lacey 
explain the actual causality between investment and penal policy. The closest she gets is telling that employer 
organizations "have strong reason to use their considerable bargaining power with government to press for generous 
welfare provision for workers who are temporarily unemployed but whose skills remain necessary to the economy", 
while "the costs of pursuing socially exclusionary policies in areas such as criminal justice are relatively high" (Lacey 
2008, pp. 79–80). Does this suggest that in coordinated economies employer organizations regularly participate in 
criminal justice policymaking and advocate moderation? Without evidence the notion sounds unlikely. The factor that 
policymaking requires negotiating at all might very well make it more coolheaded (Lacey 2008, p. 71) but that is not an 
argument based on incentives unless economic actors and considerations are involved. "By contrast", Lacey (2008, p. 
109) believes "liberal market systems oriented to flexibility and mobility have turned inexorably to punishment as a 
means of managing a population consistently excluded from the post-Fordist economy" but does not explain what is the 
purpose of this penal management. If the argument is that the welfare state and imprisonment could function as 
alternative forms of social control, as Cavadino and Dignan (2011) point out, while there is some evidence that 
economic equality can reduce crime, there is little evidence that mass imprisonment is effective in that and could work 
as more than a symbolic patch for the welfare state in this regard (and Lacey seems to agree, 2008, p. 189–190). 
Furthermore, in urging for penal reform in the liberal economies Lacey (2008, pp. 185–189) brings up the huge costs of 
mass imprisonment, which seems to contradict the idea that it is the relative affordability of mass imprisonment in 
liberal economies (Lacey 2008, p. 59) that sustains it in the first place and that cost incentives really are a determining 
factor in the eagerness to utilize imprisonment. At times Lacey (e.g. 2008, pp. 82–83) suggests a parallel hypothesis that 
social distances created by inequality make it emotionally easier to inflict degrading punishment to the poor. I find this 
hypothesis much easier to accept but it relates to the production regime only indirectly through its influence on welfare 
state policy and redistribution. 
As policies, decommodification (welfare state) and coordination (production regime) both refer to social and economic 
policies that regulate the economy in lieu of the supremacy of the market institution. According to Cavadino and 
Dignan, and Lacey, the strength of these policies is connected to the harshness of penal policy. The relationship is 
inverse and in a sample of developed economies more or less linear. If taken mostly as an empirical observation given 
the incompleteness of Lacey’s theory, possible differences in nuance between the concepts are not of great importance. 
As the most obvious source of policies, the political system could be a possible independent determinant of both 
economic regulation and penal policy. Lacey investigates the relationship of democratic systems with criminal justice. 
While Lacey occasionally refers to the incorporation of relevant partners in policymaking in coordinated economies (as 
in a quote above), she seems to include corporatism conceptually in the coordinated production regime instead of 
considering that institutionalized interest representation could be understood as part of the political system. Thus Lacey 
(2008, pp. 62–77, 2012, pp. 207–215) mostly reduces the political system to the electoral system: Proportional 
representation typical in coordinated economies favours the moderate left and aids in the building of coalitions needed 
to back inclusive economic and social policy. By contrast, in first-past-the-post systems popular in liberal economies 
politics revolve around winning over the so called median voter and the crime theme can be effectively utilized in 
achieving that. However, in an interesting natural experiment transition to proportional representation did not stop 
punitive penal trends in the liberal New Zealand, which leads Lacey (2012, pp. 216–227) to abandon the electoral 
system as the prime determinant of criminal justice in favour of the totality of the political economy. 
Another explanation for the lack of change in New Zealand could be that other aspects of the political system are more 
crucial than the electoral system. Political scientist Arend Lijphart’s richer analysis of democratic systems distinguishes 
between two ideal types: Lijphart (2012) defines consensus democracy as characterized, in general, by inclusion and 
compromising and, institutionally in the “executives-parties dimension”, by strong parliaments, coalition politics, 
proportional representation, and corporatism. Majoritarian democracy, reversely, is characterized, in general, by 
exclusion and conflict and, institutionally, by executive dominance, two-party system, and interest pluralism. 
Advocating consensus Lijphart presents statistical evidence from a regression analysis of 36 free countries that 
consensus democracies equal majoritarian democracies in effective governing and economic performance and that they 
systematically triumph in democratic quality as well as in “kindness” in the level of social expenditure and in penal 
policy among other measures. Lijphart also presents a “federal-unitary dimension”, in which consensus democracy is 
characterized institutionally by federalism and other arrangements that fragment power between institutions. However, 
they do not cluster together with the institutions of the executives-parties dimension nor do they correlate with the 
effectiveness, quality, or kindness of democracy. Table 1 summarizes six other statistical institutionalist comparisons all 
explaining the dependent variable of imprisonment rate. Their findings reinforce the idea of an inverse relationship 
between penal harshness and decommodifying economic regulation (measured as welfare state expenditure). With 
regards to meta-political institutions, imprisonment rates seem to have an inverse correlation with corporatist interest 
representation (the most recent study stressing its independent significance) and consensus democracy, which 
conceptually includes corporatism, while some of the studies have found a positive correlation with federalism. The 
studies have varyingly controlled for factors such as crime, multiculturalism, and unemployment. 
Cavadino and Dignan, Lacey, and the statistical analyses leave us with an established correlation between imprisonment 
rates and economic regulation understood as decommodification and a hint that a fuller analysis of the interrelationship 
of penal and economic regulation with the political system and corporatism in particular might be a way forward. My 
intention is to show that Durkheim’s theories on law and politics are compatible with the correlations found between 
economic regulation, and corporatism and federalism with punishment, and offer a direction towards understanding the 
mechanics. I will start, however, by discussing the position of institutional regulation in Durkheim’s metatheory. 
 
  
Table 1. Statistical institutionalist comparisons explaining imprisonment rates 
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DURKHEIM THE MORALIST 
Cavadino and Dignan, and Lacey situate themselves broadly as adherents to the political economy school of sociology 
of criminal law. They do not devote much thought to Durkheim, but from the little they discuss him, it seems that their 
rejection or neglect of Durkheim as a possible ally for institutionalist sociology of criminal law derives precisely from a 
perception of Durkheim as a cultural theorist (see Cavadino and Dignan 2002, p. 73, 2006b, p. 9; Lacey et al. 2018, p. 
201). There are, however, many traits in Durkheim’s sociology that could make his theories appealing for someone 
looking for relatively stable explanations for differences that material theory cannot account for. Durkheim himself 
situated his approach very much in the midway of systematic comparisons between singularism and universalism that 
Lacey calls for in contemporary sociology of punishment. Questions of institutions and economic regulation are 
prevalent in Durkheim’s works both in general and in relation to criminal law and punishment. As elaborated in The 
Rules of Sociological Method, important to Durkheim’s (1938) methodology were the concept of social fact as well as 
causal explaining and open-mindedness. For Durkheim sociology is about types and categories that lie between 
historical singularity and universal humanness. A social fact is external to individual psyche, socially constraining, and 
independent of its individual expressions.  
Of particular interest to the possibility of reading Durkheim in a realist and institutionalist fashion is the preface of the 
book's second edition where Durkheim discusses emergence and the concept of institution. Social facts receive their 
causal force from their emergent quality: 
"Whenever certain elements combine and thereby produce, by the fact of their combination, new phenomena, it is plain 
that these new phenomena reside not in the original elements but in the totality formed by their union. The living cell 
contains nothing but mineral particles, as society contains nothing but individuals. Yet it is patently impossible for the 
phenomena characteristic of life to reside in the atoms of hydrogen, oxygen, carbon, and nitrogen. ... The inanimate 
particles of the cell do not assimilate food, reproduce, and, in a word, live; only the cell itself as a unit can achieve these 
functions. ... Let us apply this principle to sociology. If, as we may say, this synthesis constituting every society yields 
new phenomena, differing from those which take place in individual consciousnesses, we must, indeed, admit that these 
facts reside exclusively in the very society itself which produces them, and not in its parts, i.e., its members." 
(Durkheim 1938, pp. xlvii–xlviii) 
People are born to a world of institutions: "We ourselves took no part in their formation, and consequently we cannot by 
introspection discover the causes which brought them about. Furthermore, even when we have collaborated in their 
genesis, we can only with difficulty obtain even a confused and inexact insight into the true nature of our action and the 
causes which determined it." (Durkheim 1938, p. xlv.) Institutions are beliefs and modes of conduct whose origin is in 
collective action. Durkheim (1938, p. xlvi) mentions state, family, property rights, contract, and punishment as basic 
examples of institutions. "Since this joint activity takes place outside each one of us ... its necessary effect is to fix, to 
institute outside us, certain ways of acting and certain judgements which do not depend on each particular will taken 
separately." (Durkheim 1938 p. lvi.) As the concept covers the idea of a social constraint or fact so well, Durkheim 
(1938, p. lvi) goes on to say that sociology could even be "defined as the science of institutions, of their genesis and of 
their functioning". 
Institutional regulation has an important position in Durkheim's sociology that tends to receive little attention in 
culturalist readings of Durkheim (e.g. Alexander 2005). Durkheim is depicted as becoming a cultural theorist after 
abandoning the materialism of his early works.  An overarching theme in Durkheim's work which determined 
Durkheim's objects of study from the division of labour to religion was the conditions for the creation of morals (Joas 
1993). Durkheim deemed the decaying collective and religious morality of the past as both unfitting and undesirable for 
the modern secular society but maintained it needed to be replaced with a new and fitting one. The pathology of the 
modern society was the absence of this taking place. The anxiety could not be solved by libertarian capitalism and its 
extreme alternative communism because both reduced social problems to material conditions and dismissed their moral 
nature. So, what did this moral nature mean? In his Moral Education lectures Durkheim (1973, pp. 17–126) defines 
morality as a regulating set of norms and a social fact external to the individual. Morality is accepted internally instead 
of being accepted for instrumental reasons. Self-discipline releases the individual from instincts to reflexion and hence 
to self-determination and freedom. The same applies to the society at large. Discipline does not suggest blind obeying. 
As opportunities and the environment change, the moral needs to change as well. In addition to discipline morality 
requires social attachment—ultimately to the humankind but in the world of nation states to its surrogate: one’s own 
society, and simultaneously to social groups of lower levels. Morality is categorical and distinct from egoism. A moral 
act is something not done to benefit oneself, one’s own group, or any single group but something done for the social 
good. Durkheim’s example illustrates what this means: Charity is only quasi-moral. Organized social security is 
genuinely moral. These same general themes mark Durkheim’s discussions of morality beginning from his early The 
Division of Labour in Society. 
Durkheim was frustrated with the lack of actual social change under the tumultuous surface of his native France of the 
long nineteenth century. Normatively Durkheim was committed to economic justice and the enhancement of individual 
freedom. Politically Durkheim can be contextualized as an academic representative of a broader solidarist movement 
alternative to both laissez-faire liberalism and economic collectivism (Hayward 1960; Tiryakian and Morgan 2014). 
Durkheim had favourable if qualified views on socialism: he believed the industrial society needed moral maturity 
instead of collapse and upheaval (Gouldner 1962). He had concluded that revolutions, while potentially intellectually 
inspiring, were poor at creating institutions (Gane 1984, pp. 325–326). The problem of moral order in modern societies 
which concerned Durkheim comes down to the lack of economic regulation. Durkheim returns to this time and again. 
Normlessness (anomie) in industrial capitalism called for an institutional reform of the state and society: What was 
required was the political engagement of everyone, removal of inequalities, and secular education. (Müller 1993, pp. 
95–96.) The nature and actors of this reform will be discussed below. The way Durkheim repeatedly and beginning with 
The Division of Labour distinguishes himself from the advocates of economic determinism is by the stress he gives to 
the significance of the normative order. Both the materialist extremes of market libertarianism on one hand and utopian 
communism on the other promised to free the society from the uncertainty of moral administrating. For example, the 
early Soviet legal scholar Evgeny Pashukanis (1980, pp. 46–49, 101–109) believed that, following post-revolutionary 
reorganization of material relations, class and individual interests will fuse and morals, law, and the state will cease to 
exist. When Durkheim proclaims there is no purely material solution to the social question, he means that modern 
societies require constant regulating as do all communities. Accepting any kind of compromise between the two 
materialist extremes sentences the society to never-ending regulatory discretion and adjustment—and accept we must, 
according to him. 
Durkheim does grant purely material factors such as human geography causal significance, but he also gives that to 
institutional structures. People are born to a pre-existing world and to pre-existing social facts, which are real to the 
individuals although new ones can also be created and old ones altered. In fact, what makes the social type in its most 
basic Durkheimian sense as a spatial and communicative human formation significant is precisely whether and to what 
extent the environment exists for the social structures to start emerging: 
"There are always beliefs and practices common to men which are not inscribed in their tissues. But this character is 
more manifest as the social mass and density grow. The more people there are in association, and the more they react 
upon one another, the more also does the product of these relations pass beyond the bounds of the organism. Man thus 
finds himself placed under the sway of causes sui generis whose relative part in the constitution of human nature 
becomes ever more considerable." (Durkheim 1933a, pp. 345–346.)  
Moral, which is general and external to the individual, can only emerge in a community. The external nature may even 
give it a supernatural air. The existence of solidarity and hence the community is conditional to it. These general ideas 
are present in Durkheim’s work from The Division of Labour even to his late The Elementary Forms of the Religious 
Life, where Durkheim (1915) concludes that religion is the force of community external to the individual experienced as 
supernatural. Religion builds on the material bedrock of the social type but creates unreducible consequences.  
DURKHEIM’S SOCIOLOGY OF LAW 
Durkheim wanted to understand what makes societies possible. For him law is an instrument of social regulation, and 
especially in modernity it becomes the basis for social coexistence (Vogt 1993, pp. 71–72).  Durkheim (1933a, pp. 32–
69) starts The Division of Labour, the prime source for his legal thinking, by making the case for the sociological and 
empirical study of morals. Moral facts are, according to him, real and therefore cannot be discovered or changed purely 
as mental or philosophical exercise. The motivation for the study was to survey the regulatory reality and ways to 
improve it. Law in this context was an observable operationalization of the regulatory state of society. Durkheim poses 
the normative question, should social division of labour be embraced despite warnings of its alienating effects. He 
suggests that division of labour is, in fact, a moral force necessary for the cohesion and thus existence of large societies.  
In The Division of Labour Durkheim (1933a, pp. 70–110) defines a crime by the reaction it evokes. An offended 
sentiment elicits a passionate defence. Shared sentiments are particularly strong as are the reactions they arouse. Crime 
is an act which violates a strong and defined shared consciousness and is punishable by law. Because the sentiment is 
collective, so is the reaction, and if there is no collective reaction, the norm weakens. Punishment protects uniform 
normative expectations. Punishment is an emotional and collective expiation of the crime. Its intensity is relative both to 
the strength of the collective sentiment and to the magnitude of the breach. As a collective reaction it is (genuinely) 
external to the individual and therefore often given a religious interpretation. It brings people closer together and is an 
opportune moment for smooth social organization. Repressive law (criminal law) corresponds to a traditional type of 
social solidarity (composition of social ties) based on likeness which Durkheim calls mechanical solidarity. When 
solidarity is built on strong collective consciousness, deviation is socially dangerous in itself. Durkheim concludes that 
the predominance of criminal law in a society measures its reliance on mechanical solidarity.  
The same notion of punishment but in the form of a practical theory can be found in the Moral Education lectures. 
Punishment has little effect in deterring from rule-breaking or conditioning the rule-breaker. However, punishment 
indicates to the community that the rule continues to stand and helps to preserve its authority. The essence of 
punishment is reprimand—not suffering. A good punishment is proportional and minimal. Great vertical social 
distances, however, lead to penal abuse. (Durkheim 1973, pp. 158–206.)  
Durkheim proposed that the welfare state could create a new form of solidarity in functionally differentiated societies 
(Flora and Heidenheimer 1981, pp. 23–24). In growing societies rising population density together with the 
development of transportation and communication technology increase competition between people, which people seek 
to avoid by compartmentalizing professionally. Division of labour is struggle for survival which allows a growing 
number of people to exist together. Society creates the specialized individual. Secondary factors weaken the collective 
consciousness and facilitate this specialization: Life experiences of people become decreasingly shared in a large 
society, and the collective consciousness becomes more abstract and law less casuistic. Urbanization weakens the social 
control imposed by tradition and community. Tolerance towards deviation increases. The natural amendment for the 
crumbling of mechanical solidarity in high modernity is organic solidarity: cohesion based on the cooperation and 
growing interdependence of unlike people defined by reverence towards the individual whose unique value for the 
society increases. The collective moral foundation for this new form of solidarity is positive restitutive law (family, 
contract, commercial, procedural, administrative, and constitutional law), which creates the conditions for the formation 
of specialized relationships. Disturbances are not expiated with a punishment but simply corrected. The predominance 
of positive restitutive law in a society measures its reliance on organic solidarity. (Durkheim 1933a, pp. 111–132, 168–
173, 256–263, 266–271, 283–301, 396–405.) The nature of criminal law itself as penal law remains (cf. Mead 1918), 
but its significance for social cohesion diminishes. Contrary to classical liberal theory, democratization and growing 
individualism do not mean a decrease in regulation and the advent of a night-watchman state. The absoluteness of 
power and the abundance of regulation do not go together. Rather, the growing number of particularized relationships 
calls for a more and more complex social regulatory framework. It is only the balance between the regulatory types 
which changes. The extent of criminal law and restitutive regulation correlate negatively. (Durkheim 1933a, pp. 200–
229.)  
While attempting to prove his theory Durkheim (e.g. 1933a, pp. 133–146) makes huge journeys in time and space, I 
contend that mechanical and organic solidarity are better taken more cautiously primarily as conceptualizations of 
alternative ways of constructing cohesion in modern states albeit the first one relying more on tradition and the latter 
one being perhaps truer to the course of social development. Said in Durkheimian terms, modern societies too need 
regulation, but it must fit the new social type and therefore be predominantly restitutive. People are socially and morally 
enabled, and those aspects of life should not be done away with. However, by claiming progress towards organic 
solidarity is normal Durkheim is, I would argue, only saying it is structurally consistent. Durkheim is sometimes 
caricaturized as believing law would spring spontaneously from the moral will of the people. The contrary is true. Book 
Three of The Division of Labour returns the reader to reality from the ideal-typical vision of organic solidarity (Rawls 
2003). The restitutive moral framework awaits setting up (Durkheim 1933a, pp. 406–409): “This is far from being on 
the verge of realization. We know only too well what a laborious work it is to erect this society where each individual 
will have the place he merits, will be rewarded as he deserves, where everybody, accordingly, will spontaneously work 
for the good of all and of each.” (Durkheim 1933a, p. 408.)  
Durkheim’s discussion of the pathological forms of division of labour that afflict the society in the meantime can be 
used to help clarify the substance of the lacking restitutive regulation. In anomic division of labour capital and labour 
are uncoupled and workers are treated like cogs in the machine. This would be solved by increasing regularity and 
harmony in the economy by regulating terms of employment and other trade specific concerns. In forced division of 
labour individual autonomy and social mobility are lacking. These constraints should be relieved by increasing the 
“external equality” of parties in contractual relations. It seems strongly that by this Durkheim means some level of 
decommodification: According to Durkheim, contractual solidarity requires that a party is autonomous enough from the 
markets to refuse an unfair contract. He continues that the same logic of justice demands that people’s livelihood is 
made increasingly independent not only of inherited status but also of their ability to contribute. Durkheim emphasizes 
that this equality and emancipation is not natural (physical) but a result of institutions and regulation. (See Durkheim 
1933a, pp. 353–388, 1957, pp. 208–220.) As will be discussed below, Durkheim assigns the task of fixing the anomic 
division of labour primarily to modern intermediary organizations and the task of fixing forced division of labour to the 
democratic state. 
In sum, according to Durkheim, in a modern heterogeneous society a strong restitutive regulatory framework can build 
society-wide cohesion and limit the promotion of penal sanctions. Although Durkheim defines positive restitutive law 
as encompassing essentially all law except criminal law and property law, the core of Durkheim’s concern is economic 
regulation and decommodifying social security. Alternatively, if the socioeconomic organization is deregulated and 
constrained by tradition and inheritance, (subgroup) mechanical solidarity and its associated form of law prevails. The 
basic conclusion is the same that Cavadino and Dignan, Lacey, and the referenced statistical analyses have made: an 
inverse correlation between the level of economic regulation and intensity of punishment in society. 
POLITICAL CONDITIONS FOR ORGANIC SOLIDARITY 
Durkheim (1983) repeated in a dedicated article about penal evolution his argument that the intensity of punishment has 
a negative correlation with social complexity but added that it also has a positive correlation with state absolutism. The 
article is cursory, and just as his first argument could hardly be understood from it without reference to his general legal 
theory, the second one necessitates familiarization with his political theory.1 Already in the The Division of Labour 
Durkheim (1933a, pp. 181–190, 301–303) had associated the two solidarity types with corresponding social structures: 
Mechanical solidarity is consistent with a society made up of self-sufficient (geographical) segments such as provinces. 
Organic solidarity is consistent with a society made up of differentiated organs where the professional milieu transcends 
regional divisions. In this respect he considered the actual contemporary lack of professional social and political 
organization pathological. Later, when Durkheim’s alarm over economic deregulation only worsened, he blamed it on 
the lack of these modern intermediary institutions between the individual and the state. Durkheim (1933b, pp. 1–4, 
1957, pp. 5–13) accepted that the economy becomes an increasingly central field in modern societies. For that reason it 
should be organized and regulated more, or else its normlessness threatens to contaminate other fields of life as well. 
Therefore, while secular education could alleviate the anomie (Durkheim 1973, pp. 223–236), the practical solution that 
it most called for was the reintroduction of guilds as corporations (here trade associations). In Durkheim’s vision, 
corporations are given the moral task of formulating economic regulation in matters such as terms of employment, 
occupational safety, and pensions (Durkheim 1952, pp. 306–320, 1957, p. 40, cf. Hawkins 1994).  
Corporatism refers to an idea of society as a social body divided into functional organs with legal personhood. 
Medieval Europe saw the rise of self-governing sectoral corporations such as guilds and universities, yet they eventually 
lost to absolutist state power. With time an academic concern about social disintegration led to the building of 
progressive corporatist theory calling for the labour movement’s integration to the social order along with the capital. 
Arrangements started to appear where trade unions were given benefits and access to power in exchange for industrial 
peace and where agreements were made between employers and employees under state coordination. Early applications 
of corporatism were, however, often authoritarian and marked by a lack of the autonomy corporations had been 
afforded in theory. It was only the post-war Europe which saw the coming of social corporatism respectful of freedom 
of association anticipated by the likes of Durkheim. In the inclusive, participatory, and democratic neo-corporatism of 
developed European welfare states corporations represent upwards as well as deliberate, create, and sometimes execute 
regulation. (Wiarda 1997, pp. 28–46, 95–123.)  
 
1 In the article Durkheim among other things neglects to explain why modernization is associated with growing 
individualism. The two correlations are not the two laws mentioned in the title of the article but two aspects of one of 
them (the “quantitative law”).  
Setting the stage for Durkheim's corporatism, one trait prevalent in Durkheim’s work in general and typical for 
Continental corporatist thinkers (see Black 1984, esp. pp. 129–142) but alien for much of liberal theory is the way 
Durkheim does not make strong distinctions between formal and affective relationships and civil and personal 
interactions just as he does not make a strong distinction between law and morality. What was more distinctive was 
Durkheim's embracement of division of labour and society over community. Many socialists, in particular, were much 
more intrigued by the ideal of the commune as a territorial unit and co-operative of self-governing workers (Black 1984, 
pp. 189–192). Durkheim makes a qualitative choice in favour of forms of association that are structurally compatible 
with division of labour at the expense of the geographical corporatism of communes. Durkheim does not demonize the 
state either: Durkheim combines corporatism with Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s idea of an alliance between the individual 
and the state: individuals independent of each other and dependent on the state. Democracy can tame the state into an 
emancipatory force. 
Edward Tiryakian (1994) pointed at the contemporary topicality of Durkheim as an early theorist of corporatism as a 
solution to deregulation, but the insight has remained persistently underdeveloped. According to Durkheim (1933b, pp. 
4–25, 1957, pp. 14–39), industrialization had destroyed the guilds because markets had outgrown them geographically. 
What was lost with them was their social significance. His suggested new corporations would be nationwide and 
democratic. This would require consolidating existing trade unions, recognizing their public role, and making contacts 
between the employee and employer sides regular while maintaining their separateness.  
Durkheim outlined his theories of democratic corporatism and corporatist democracy in his sociology lectures 
(Professional Ethics and Civic Morals), which are interpreted here as a “coherent extension and practical application” 
(Black 1984, p. 223) of the social theory Durkheim had constructed hitherto. Intermediary institutions are needed for 
the creation of the secular moral regulation required for solidarity. When they are missing, the state will try to 
compensate, but because it does not have direct lines to the individuals and instruments for causing internal change in 
them, the nature of its regulatory efforts is mechanical and repressive. However, socialization by communities always 
has a dark side too, and thus it is the task of the modern state to guarantee universal individual rights. As individualism 
grows stronger, so does the state and expands its functions. Individual rights must be won from the communities, and to 
do so negative freedoms are not enough. (Durkheim 1957, pp. 55–68.) It requires positive action from the state: "For 
this task, it cannot just withdraw into the tribunals, it must be present in all spheres of social life and make itself felt." 
(Durkheim 1957, p. 65.) The nature of statist individualism being moral the individual that the state is to promote to 
earn its legitimacy is universal in contrast to the “me” of egoism. Acting on this agenda in the quasi-humanity of the 
nation state happens primarily within the field of domestic policy. Concentrating on internal improvement can turn 
states more peaceful. (Durkheim 1957, pp. 68–75.)  
The state is society’s institution for reflection in all forms of government. What makes democracy special is the 
publicity of the reflection as well as the amount of communication between the state and the people and the expansion 
of state’s domain. Publicity brightens the reflection and increases the plasticity of society. Communication increases the 
state’s awareness of regulatory needs, enhances its governing capabilities, and gives democratic law its legitimacy. The 
notion of democracy as the measurement of the will of the people, the majority, or the plurality is mistaken. Law and 
social change cannot spring spontaneously from a multitude of individual opinions. While the state should be in 
continuous communication with the people, it still needs to preserve its autonomy. This circles us back to the 
intermediary institutions. They are needed for facilitating political participation of individuals and deliberation in a 
manageable scale and filter it upwards. (Durkheim 1957, pp. 76–109.) Thus, corporations both protect the individual 
from the repressive clumsiness of the absolutist state and the state from the noise of unclarified public opinion. 
Among new institutionalists, Hall and Soskice in their theory on varieties of capitalism agree with Durkheim that in the 
absence of a balance of power between corporatist associations and the state, the state has few tools to regulate the 
economy.2 Durkheim and Lijphart are not only united by a consensual understanding of democracy as deliberative and 
institutionalized will formation and by including corporatism to the framework of democratic institutions. They both 
also proceed from the challenge of a heterogeneous society as their starting point. However, a distinction follows: 
Lijphart’s primary interest has been the workings of democracy in traditionally multicultural societies. Durkheim’s 
focus was on the secular individualism rising from the weakening of traditional communities. This is the reason 
Durkheim prefers corporatism over federalism as antidote to state absolutism and visions it as replacing the receding 
facilitation of regional differences. Only corporatism is structurally consistent with division of labour and organic 
solidarity. It is tailor-made to create the moral basis for organic solidarity in a developing democracy. Notably, while 
Lijphart is theoretically open to there being multiple paths to consensus democracy, empirically he finds the correlates 
he is looking for only for the first dimension of consensus democracy, which includes corporatism, and not for the 
second, which includes federalism (see also Swank 2002). In comparative criminal justice the extremes of course seem 
to be the pluralist and federalist United States and the corporatist and relatively centralized Nordic countries.3 
It seems that “organic” individualist solidarity is the solution even if the problem is multicultural strife because 
individual autonomy alleviates the need to seek security from groups and reduces the salience of differences between 
them in the first place. Constructing loyalty towards the state across social classes and ethnic groups was, in fact, the 
explicit goal of early welfare state policy in Durkheim’s days. In modern theory this effect is usually conceptualized as 
the ability of welfare states to build social trust or capital. What matters here are universalistic social rights: Charitable, 
means tested social security does not unite but categorizes. (Crepaz and Damron 2009. See also Garland 2013.) Means 
tested social security and income inequality increase “welfare chauvinism” which consequently is weaker in 
universalistic social democratic welfare states than in conservative and liberal ones (van der Waal et al. 2013, cf. Barker 
2012). Lars Trägårdh (1997) conceptualizes the Nordic model as this kind of Rousseauian alliance between the 
individual and the state where dependence on the welfare state gives the individuals autonomy from each other. 
Individualist and universalist social security and corporatism have reduced the importance of traditional and religious 
intermediary institutions. “Hot” communal trust has been relatively replaced by “cool” societal trust. While the 
individualism reinforces tolerance towards a diversity of lifestyles, it demands assimilation to its structural logic 
including for example putting individualized children’s rights before traditionalist parents’ rights. It is compatible with 
moderate immigration but not with growth of social distances. (Trägårdh 2017.) 
In summary, new institutionalism has offered three (partially overlapping) correlations for humane criminal justice: 
strong welfare state (decommodifying economic regulation), coordinated production regime (economic regulation and 
corporatism), and consensus democracy. Durkheim offers a streamlined causal explanation: Corporatism is understood 
as a democratic institution. Restitutive (social and economic) and repressive (criminal justice) regulation are understood 
as alternative collective moral foundations for solidarity. Corporatist democracy is a causal condition for the ability of a 
 
2 See Hall and Soskice 2001, pp. 45–50. “In general, liberal market economies should find it more feasible to implement 
market-incentive policies that do not put extensive demands on firms to form relational contracts with others but rely on 
markets to coordinate their activities. … Because of the bluntness of the instruments available to states and the 
importance of markets to these economies, deregulation is often the most effective way to improve coordination in 
LMEs." (P. 49.) 
3 So-called restorative (criminal) justice despite its superficially Durkheimian sounding name is communal justice of a 
segmented society especially in its more ambitious forms of conferencing and sentencing circles (see Shapland 2011), 
and (against its ideological premises) seems to thrive better alongside high imprisonment rates in Anglophone countries 
than in corporatist countries (Wood 2015). 
modern society to build its cohesion predominantly on welfare state regulation over penal regulation. Corporative 
association of economic groups and the acknowledgment of these groups by the state leads to increased economic 
regulation made possible by the intermediary institutions, increased political participation by people facilitated by the 
intermediary institutions, increased concern towards ensuring individualistic and universal social rights in increasing 
number of policy domains by the democratized state, and a decreasing reliance on penal justice by the state. 
In this framework Nordic social democracy would be closest to Durkheim’s vision of corporatist balance of power and 
Anglophone majoritarian democracy and pluralism closer to the opposite of a dichotomy of the individual and the 
(federal) state. What distinguishes Continental “conservative corporatism” from social democratic corporatism might, in 
fact, be the relative weakness of the state towards both traditional and modern intermediary groups. 
CONCLUSION 
Hans-Peter Müller (1993, pp. 106–107) wrote how curiously Durkheimian the contemporary Western European reality 
is with coordinated economies and strong welfare states. Müller thinks this is ironic considering how Durkheim 
exaggerated the significance of moral regulation and underestimated that of power and interests. I argue taking 
institutional regulation seriously is the very reason Durkheim got it so close. Durkheim did not disregard conflict or 
social change (cf. Garland 1990, pp. 47–81). They were his departure points (Giddens 1971). For Durkheim, the lack of 
social change was the problem and structural solving of conflict its solution. 
Durkheim’s understanding of punishment as something relatively collective and non-instrumental as well as 
incompatible with restitution seems very reasonable after the collapse of the special preventative paradigm in the 1970s, 
the relatively judicial character it has persistently kept, and the strong emotions it continues to evoke. It also lends itself 
to be read as an institutionalist theory of the "political economy of punishment" in a way that is not recognized in the 
sociology of criminal law. In Durkheim’s theory in a simple community punishment asserts the unity of the group. 
Vertical distances increase penal harshness. Individualization and secularization in modern societies should lessen the 
intensity of punishment as homogenous collective consciousness declines. However, this requires building societal ties 
on something else. By decommodifying individual wellbeing welfare state regulation can act as the foundation for 
solidarity of interdependence for a society of heterogeneous individuals. This leads to an inverse relationship between 
the strength of the restitutive regulatory framework and the amount of penal repression in society. This can be compared 
to theories that look for qualitative similarities between penal policy and social policy. The question is not whether the 
welfare state can turn prisons into welfare institutions (or whether the welfare state is just an extension of the state's 
penal suppression). The Durkheimian assumption would be that, while some qualitative evolution does occur, the basic 
nature of punishment is not going to change. However the welfare state can reduce its use. Both Durkheim’s notion of 
organic solidarity and the inverse relationship of the regulatory types are empirically supported. Complex societies call 
for complex regulation, and building it is demanding. It requires communicative, deliberative, and participatory will 
formation. In modern societies the distance between the state and the people is great, and without intermediaries closing 
the gap the state will be ineffective at both listening to and governing the people. Durkheim saw social corporatism—
institutional democratization of the economy, programme making, and policy formulation—as structurally suited to 
correct economic normlessness. 
It remains a pertinent message that to function effectively democracy relies on intermediary institutions and practices 
usually not constitutionally established—that the simple mechanism of a general election does not translate into 
thought-out policies and positions without reflection and deliberation somewhere—and that these institutions should not 
be limited to ones representing the elite. Regarding the contemporary practical worth of Durkheim's theory, it can 
certainly be asked whether for example the markets have once again geographically outgrown the guilds and what this 
means for the corporatist systems of Europe. Durkheim of course did not see the nation state as the end of human 
development but envisioned, although without going into details, the coming of systems even larger and more complex. 
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